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Abstract
To what extent do the results of randomized controlled trials inform our pre-
dictions about the effectiveness of potential policy interventions? This crucial
question is often overlooked in discussions about evidence-based policy. The
view I defend is that the arguments which lead from the claim that a program
works somewhere to a prediction about the effectiveness of this program as
it will be implemented here rests on many premises, most of which cannot
be justified by the results of RCTs. RCTs only provide indirect evidence
for effectiveness, and we need much more than just RCTs results to make
reliable predictions.
Keywords: effectiveness, randomized controlled trial, warrant,
evidence-based policy, argument
1. Introduction
My topic is effectiveness hypotheses : hypotheses that a well-described
policy/treatment will work for us: it will result in an improvement in a well-
specified outcome in a targeted situation implemented as we would implement
it. Evidence-based policy (EBP) advocates have invested a great deal of effort
in providing warehouses that evaluate and store evidence for effectiveness,
warehouses to be visited by ‘ordinary’ policy makers and analysts, like the
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Cochrane Collaboration for medical studies, the Campbell Collaboration for
social policy, the US Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse,
or the Greater London Authority’s Project Oracle for ‘Understanding and
sharing what really works’ against youth violence.
These warehouses advertise that they store programs that ‘work’. What
they store are programs for which there is good reason to think they work
somewhere; if we are lucky, in a few somewheres. The warehouse keepers
police scientific studies that aim to establish causal connections between a
program and a targeted outcome; their purchasing rules favor randomized
controlled trial (RCT) study designs. A study like that provides direct evi-
dence that the program worked there, then, in the study population. What
makes that evidence that it will work here, now, as we would implement it?
Knowledge claims, including effectiveness predictions, are warranted by
good arguments, arguments that are both valid and sound. Warranted : we
have good reason to accept these claims; valid : the conclusion follows from
the premises; sound : there is good reason to think the premises are true.
The reminder that conclusions are justified by good arguments underlines
two important facts usually underplayed in EBP discussions:
1. Evidence is a 3-place relation: e is evidence for h relative to an argu-
ment A for h. Failing the other premises in A, or relative to a different
argument A′, e can be totally irrelevant to h.
2. Arguments are like chains: they are only as strong as their weakest
premise. Focusing on the argument forces the premises to the fore.
Often the unstated premises are the most dicey.
2. Warranting ‘It will work for us’
So:
A well-established empirical claim e is evidence for hypothesis h relative
to a good argument A (or A′, A′′, A′′′, . . . ) only if e is a premise in A, which
is itself a good argument for h (or, is a premise in A′ which is itself a good
argument for a premise in a good argument A for h, etc.).
The EBP literature rates positive outcomes in well-conducted RCTs as
gold standard evidence for effectiveness predictions. What’s the argument?
One could read this as a question about ‘external validity’: Will the
experimental result hold elsewhere, where there are conventionally cited facts,
like similarity between target and experimental situations, that are supposed
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to make this likely. But this is the wrong way to look at the relation between
experimental results and the claims whose truth they bear on. Experimental
results can help justify confidence that the same result – or that some different
result – will hold elsewhere; i.e., they can be evidence for one of these claims.
Whether they are evidence depends on whether they play the right kind of
role in a good argument for that claim. Similarity, or just the right kind
of dissimilarity, might play a role. But if so, only by fitting into a good
argument.
What then might a good argument look like that makes RCT results
evidence for effectiveness predictions?
RCT results are normally effect sizes : ES = the difference in the average
of the outcome (y) in treatment group and in control group (av(y)T - av(y)C).
Suppose these effects are not accidental but generated in accord with a causal
principle obtaining in the study setting, say of this form:
CP: y(i) = a + b(i)x(i) + z(i)1
where y(i) is the outcome for individual i in the study population, x(i) is the
treatment variable, a is constant and z(i) represents all other causal clusters
that contribute linearly with x to produce y in i. It is apparent from this
principle that x is a genuine contributor to y for at least some i in this setting
if and only if b(i) 6= 0. A well-known argument – labeled here Argument A′2
– shows that, under usual assumptions characterizing ideal RCTs,
ES = av(b)(X - X’)
where X is the value of the treatment in the treatment group and X’, the
value in the control group. If the effect size is non-zero, av(b) is non-zero, so
b(i) is non-zero for some i3 and thus x is a genuine contributor to y for some
individuals in populations subject to CP.
So we have a good argument – A′ – that has among its premises:
• e: ‘The effect size of x for y in a well-conducted RCT on populations
subject to CP is non-zero.’
1Note: this is not a regression equation. It represents genuine causal relations, which
regression equations will generally not do. I choose this simple linear form for convenience.
The same conclusions hold for more complex nonlinear principles.
2Cf. (Cartwright, 2007, 15-16).
3But not conversely. Positive and negative individual effects can cancel to yield ES=0.
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and as its conclusion,
• h1: ‘x contributes to the production of y for some individuals in popu-
lations subject to CP.’
Thus e is evidence for h1 relative to argument A
′ and thereby relative to the
other premises in that argument (including the assumption that conducting
the experiment well – randomizing, blinding, etc. – delivered the features
required in ideal RCTs). To establish e’s evidential relevance to h, we now
need a good argument – A – where h1 figures essentially as a premise and h
as conclusion.
But note. Often CP is written with the i’s implicit:
CP’: y = a + bx + z
This suggests that b is constant. But there are few treatments for which this
is likely. The treatment is usually only the salient factor in a cluster, and
it produces a contribution when all the factors in the cluster take the right
values at once; x contributes to y – but only when cooperating with other
factors (sometimes called ‘causal cofactors’ or ‘complementary component
causes’) and often a great many of these. In CP, b(i) represents the values
of all these supporting factors in one fell swoop.
Now to the argument. First we need a properly formulated conclusion.
Maybe. . .
• hES: ‘If x = X in our setting, as opposed to x = X’, keeping fixed all
other causes of y here4, the effect size would be ES here too’.
Will x make the same average contribution in the situation here as in the
study situation there? Recall: b is not constant; and the effect size is its
average. The average in each situation depends on the distribution of the
supporting factors for x in that situation. Even if the same principles govern
the two, that provides no reason for the distributions of support factors to be
the same. To the contrary, this distribution often depends heavily on local
circumstances.
Nor is the same distribution what you want. You’d really like to arrange
to a distribution favouring values of b that provide the largest contribution.
4Excepting those downstream from x.
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At the least, you want some values which make x’s contribution positive
and these should outweigh those making it negative. If getting negative
contributions in some individuals is bad, then you want none of these.
Suppose though we aim to predict simply hcont, that the policy will con-
tribute positively in our situation. What can make RCT evidence relevant?
Let ‘x plays a causal role’ mean x appears in the principle governing y. Here
is what seems to be the weakest valid argument using RCT results there as
a premise, concluding that the program contributes here.
Argument A:
A1. x plays a causal role in the principle that governs y’s pro-
duction there.
A2. x plays a causal role here as well as there.
A3. The support factors necessary for x to operate are present
for some individuals here.
Therefore, x plays a causal role here and the support factors nec-
essary for it to operate are present for some individuals.
The RCT enters in a different argument, supporting premise A1. It is not
direct evidence for effectiveness, where a well-warranted empirical claim e is
direct evidence for h if and only if e figures essentially in a good argument
for h. A′ is a valid argument taking as premise a positive effect size in an
experiment and as conclusion, that the program contributes to the outcome
in the study situation. The other premises in A′ are about further features of
the study (like ‘confounding factors are distributed evenly in treatment and
control groups’). Evidence warehouses police these premises for particular
studies. Find a program in a conscientious warehouse provides good reason
to think there is a valid and sound argument that x plays a causal role
somewhere – which is the first premise in argument A.
So the RCT result can be evidence for effectiveness here, but indirectly.
It is not a premise in an argument for effectiveness but a premise in an
argument for a premise:
[Figure 1 goes here with the following caption: RCTs as indirect evidence
for effectiveness.]
Its relevance is highly conditional, depending on the validity and sound-
ness of arguments A′ and A. As in figure 2, a positive effect size in an RCT
is leveraged into evidence that the program works there in the RCT by A′;
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‘it works there’ is leveraged into evidence for ‘it works here’ by A. If either
A or A′ fail, the lever drops and the evidential relevance disappears with a
thud:
[Figure 2 goes here with the following caption: RCTs as conditional evi-
dence for effectiveness.]
A′ and A are valid, so what matters is their soundness. We may grant
that A′ is good if the program appears in a reputable warehouse. A2. and A3.
are the additional premises necessary in A. What arguments support these?
That’s the problem. There are no warehouses for information like this and
the kind of information needed is hard to come by. I don’t see how A2. can
be supported without a great deal of theory; so too with A3., in order to
identify what the support factors are. A3. also requires local knowledge to
determine if even some of the right values for support factors obtain let alone
a desirable distribution.
Now consider two objections to my account of what counts as warrant for
effectiveness predictions.
First: RCTs are often advocated by people who think our claims to the-
oretical knowledge are too slippery to trust. So they oppose my view about
how A2. gets warranted. They offer an alternative: more RCTs, with as
much variation in circumstances as possible. I agree. More RCTs, especially
across a variety of circumstances, can improve the warrant for effectiveness
predictions – because they support premises like A2.: the program plays a
causal role here. How?
That’s the rub. The argument could be by enumerative induction: swan
1 is white, swan 2 is white, . . . ; x plays a causal role in situation 1, x plays a
causal role in situation 2, . . . How good is that argument? Induction demands
a large and varied inductive base – lots of swans from lots of places; lots of
RCTs from different populations. It also requires that the observations be
projectable, plus an account of the range across which they project. Electron
charge is projectable everywhere – one good experiment can generalise to
all; bird colour sometimes is; causality is dicey. Many causal connections
depend on intimate, complex interactions among factors present so that no
special role for the factor of interest can be prised out and projected to new
situations.
Rather than some weak inductive argument, I urge a rigorous deductive
argument. Then we know what we are betting on when we bet on the con-
clusion. So I add the premise that x’s causal role is the same here as in all
those other places. That makes the challenge clear: What is the warrant for
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this very strong claim? This matters because of the weakest link principle:
the conclusion can have no more warrant than any of its premises.
Second. Surely the best evidence that the program will work here is an
RCT here. Agreed, this could at least be good evidence. Could be, were it
possible. We never do RCTs on the same population at the same time. And
both matter. A sample is almost never representative, that is: governed by
the same causal principles and having the same probability distribution over
causally relevant factors. And time cannot be ignored. Are the causes the
same now as when the study was done? That’s a serious question for socioe-
conomic policy since economists from J.S. Mill5 to the econometrician David
Hendry6 worry that past regularities are poor guides to the future because
the background arrangement of causes shifts so often and so unpredictably.
Of course the experimental population could be representative enough and
the causes stable enough. Let’s just get this stated explicitly as one of our
premises so that the need for warrant for it is transparent.
3. Conclusion
It is not a new idea that evidence is relative to an argument, and it may
not be controversial. But taking it seriously matters. It is altogether too
easy, when we do not keep the arguments to the fore, to overestimate the
warrant our studies can deliver. RCTs for instance. Evidence-based policy
takes them as gold standard evidence for effectiveness claims, though with a
caution. The U.S. Department of Education, for example, warns that trials
on white suburban populations do not constitute strong evidence for large
inner city schools serving primarily minority students.7
This kind of warning conceals what needs to be exposed. What argument
makes a particular RCT result evidence for a particular effectiveness predic-
tion? If evidence, it is indirect – there are layers of arguments to get from
study results to effectiveness conclusions:
[Figure 3 goes here with the following caption: Layers of arguments be-
tween RCT results and effectiveness predictions.]
They all have additional premises, every one of which is essential for
the security of the conclusion. No matter how firm the RCT result, the
5Cf. (Mill, 1836 [1967]).
6Cf. (Hendry, 2004, 12-13) and references therein.
7Cf. (U.S. Dept. of Ed., 2003, 10).
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effectiveness conclusion can have no greater claim to knowledge than the
shakiest of these premises.
[Figure 4 goes here with the following caption: The chain from RCTs to
effectiveness predictions.]
Nor is this unusual. Most of our knowledge claims, even in our securest
branches of science, rest on far more premises than we like to imagine, and
far shakier. This recommends a dramatic degree of epistemic modesty.
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